)>IJH=?J Recent empirical work suggests that consumers systematically misperceive commodity taxes when the after-tax price is not prominent. I show how policymakers may utilize such low-salience taxes to enhance consumer welfare. The optimal combination of highand low-salience taxes balances two competing welfare eects: low-salience taxes accommodate lower tax rates but induce consumers to misallocate their budgets. The eciency gains from implementing the optimal policy are substantial, up to the entire deadweight loss from distortionary taxation. The surprising result that the optimal policy is to induce taxpayer mistakes can be readily understood as an application of the theory of the second-best.
Introduction
The subject of optimal commodity taxation lies at the heart of public nance. Most research in the area asks how policymakers should levy taxes across goods to achieve eciency and distributional goals when lump-sum taxes are unavailable. In contrast, the question of how to implement a particular tax on a single good has not received the same degree of theoretical attention.
Recent empirical ndings suggest a need to reconsider this emphasis. A series of papers suggests that the design of a tax in particular the taxs salience has important eects on consumer behavior: the more prominent the after-tax price of a good, the more consumers respond to changes in the tax rate on that good.
The presence of such salience eects suggests an additional margin through which policymakers can shape the behavioral eects of a tax. In many contexts, policymakers have a range of options for how to design a tax, and each option may be associated with a dierent degree of salience. For example, road tolls can be collected manually by cash transfers or automatically through an EZ-Pass system (Finkelstein 2009 ); property tax payments may be collected on their own or bundled into a monthly mortgage payment to an escrow account (Hayashi 2012, Cabral and Hoxby 2010) ; income tax payments may be collected from employees or automatically withheld (Jones 2010 ). In the context of commodity taxation, policymakers may manipulate salience through their choice of whether to include a tax in a See, for example, Chetty, Looney, and Kroft (2009) (grocery store customers reduce demand for goods when the sales tax inclusive price is posted; beer consumption declines more in response to excise tax changes (high-salience) than to sales tax changes (low-salience)); Finkelstein (2009) (drivers' behavior becomes less sensitive to tolls upon adoption of EZ-Pass systems); Cabral and Hoxby (2010) (property taxes are lower in jurisdictions that allow the tax to be collected in less salient ways); Hayashi (2012) (low-salience property tax designs reduce the probability of appealing municipal valuations); Feldman and Rue (2013) (lab experiment documenting participants' tendency to spend more when faced with tax-exclusive prices as compared to taxinclusive prices); Gallagher and Muehlegger (2008) (income tax incentives to purchase fuel-ecient vehicles were most eective in the quarters most closely following income tax payment); Fochmann and Weimann (2011) (eld experiment participants exerted more eort in response to a constant net wage when taxed than when untaxed); Goldin and Homono (2013) (high-income consumers exhibit inattentiveness to cigarette sales taxes). Krishna and Slemrod (2003) and McCaery (1994) review earlier evidence on how tax design aects behavior and discuss implications for policy. A related literature documents that income tax lers tend to systematically misperceive marginal tax rates, e.g., Liebman and Zeckhauser (2004) .
Throughout, I employ salience to refer to the prominence of the taxed good's tax-inclusive price. Thus an excise tax included in a good's posted price is high-salience even though consumers may not be able to identify how much of what they pay is tax as opposed to price charged by the retailer. goods posted price or to add it on at the register (at the time the consumer checks out of the store). To the extent that the former are more salient than the latter (Chetty, Looney, and Kroft 2009), governments may alter a tax's salience by adjusting the degree to which it relies on these two tax designs.
! Thus although policymakers typically lack perfect control over the salience of a given tax, they frequently face a choice between relying on high-and low-salience ways of raising revenue. And because so many questions of tax design are linked to issues of salience, policymakers end up making decisions about salience whether they intend to or not whenever they levy a new tax.
"
This paper considers the question of optimal commodity tax salience: how should a benevolent government choose between high-and low-salience taxes on a particular good in order to raise some required amount of revenue?
# The analysis highlights two distinct mechanisms through which tax salience aects consumers' well-being. On the one hand, lowsalience taxes dampen the excess burden traditionally associated with distortionary taxation; because consumers are less prone to substitute away from goods subject to low-salience taxes, such taxes are less distortionary for a given amount of revenue raised. On the other hand, low-salience taxes drive taxpayers to make optimization errors, reducing welfare by causing the misallocation of income among consumption goods. The government's decision between high-and low-salience taxes trades o between these two welfare eects.
My results suggest an important role for salience considerations in the design of tax policy. When policymakers lack access to lump-sum taxation, commodity taxes generate an excess burden by distorting consumption decisions between taxed and untaxed goods.
However, I show that when the government has access to tax instruments that dier in ! Policymakers may also manipulate commodity tax salience by adopting tax-inclusive pricing regulations, which require retailers to include the full amount of consumption taxes in the prices displayed to consumers, for all goods. Such regulations are common in Europe but are quite rare in the United States. Similarly, governments may require tax-inclusive pricing for a particular good. For example, new rules require websites selling airline tickets to include state and federal airline taxes in the initial price displayed to consumers.
" To take a recent example, the state of Colorado is deciding how much of its new marijuana tax to levy as an excise tax and how much to levy as a sales tax (New York Times 2013). Chetty (2009b) . As I elaborate below, this framework allows one to conduct welfare analysis while remaining agnostic about the exact mechanism driving taxpayer under-reaction to low-salience taxes, at least within a broad range of plausible models. their salience, it can employ those instruments in combination to enhance eciency. In fact, when taxpayer mistakes are suciently robust to changes in the tax rate, I show that the optimal policy achieves the rst-best welfare outcome, even without access to a lump-sum tax. Intuitively, the presence of multiple tax instruments with diering degrees of salience provides policymakers with an additional degree of freedom with which to shape consumer consumption decisions. The optimal combination of high-and low-salience taxes induces taxpayers to consume at the same consumption bundle they would choose if faced with a lump-sum tax (even though this consumption decision is actually sub-optimal from the consumers perspective given the distortionary tax that is actually in place). The model and assumptions I rely on to reach this result are exactly those adopted by .
I next turn to the question of characterizing the optimal combination of high-and lowsalience taxes. Solving the government's problem yields a simple and intuitive formula for the optimal policy. Several interesting results emerge. Most notably, the optimal size of the low-salience tax is always non-zero. Although low-salience taxes drive consumers to make optimization errors, the welfare costs of those errors is second-order for small values of the tax. In contrast, even small values of a low-salience tax may raise substantial revenues, allowing the government to reduce distortionary high-salience taxes while still meeting its budget constraint. Additionally, the optimal ratio of high-to low-salience taxes depends on the properties of the good being taxed. For luxury goods, or for goods that make up a large share of consumer expenditures, governments should (all else equal) rely more heavily on high-salience taxes. In contrast, the presence of many close substitutes for a taxed good implies that low-salience taxes will tend to be more ecient. Intuitively, high-salience taxes tend to be more ecient when consumption of the taxed good is associated with negative externalities.
Finally, I consider an extension of the model to the case in which tax salience is endogenously related to the size of the tax and derive conditions under which teh rst-best welfare outcome will be attainable. Even when the rst-best is unattainable, I show how policymakers may use the optimal salience formula to make incremental improvements to consumer welfare.
Despite the ubiquity of policy decisions that aect tax salience, the topic has received little theoretical attention. Indeed, as Congdon, Kling, and Mullainathan (2009) 
Framework for Behavioral Welfare Analysis
The empirical literature on salience suggests that decision-makers fail to perfectly optimize when taxes are less than fully-salient.
$ Adjusting decision-making models to account for $ Of course, the literature discussed in Section 1 does not prove that low-salience taxes induce consumers to behave sub-optimally, even putting aside questions of econometric validity. After all, any observed choice behavior can be rationalized by suciently relaxing one's assumptions concerning the content of the preferences being observed. The observed behavioral discrepancy between high-and low-salience taxes only constitutes evidence of irrationality if one assumes that the form of a tax is irrelevant to the taxpayers true preferences.
departures from rationality can have important implications for welfare analysis, but one quickly runs into the problem that a large (potentially very large) number of models may be able to explain some observed pattern of decision-making, yet each do so in a way that implies a dierent welfare conclusion.
One approach to addressing this problem is to attempt to dierentiate competing positive behavioral models empirically, waiting to draw welfare conclusions until the true decisionmaking model has been identied. However, the observationally-distinct qualities of competing decision-making models can be subtle at best, and the large number of potential models available may mean that condently identifying the true underlying model may be a Sisyphean task. Assumption (A1) states that if one holds an agents consumption bundle xed, changing the tax rate or design does not aect the agents welfare. Although it is usually implicit, (A1) appears in most standard public nance models; writing an agent's utility in terms of consumption alone implies that other parameters (such as the tax rate) do not directly enter the utility function. To understand the assumption, consider an example in which it fails: an agent would violate (A1) if she preferred facing a register tax to a posted tax on political grounds, perhaps because the amount being paid to the government is more transparent under the former relative to the latter. An important limitation of (A1) is that it rules out a class of interesting models in which decision-makers experience a psychic cost when faced with a low-salience tax, independent of the ultimate eect of the tax on their consumption. Although this approach to behavioral welfare anlysis requires imposing assumptions on the content of consumers preferences, the payo to that assumption is substantial. I am able to derive simple and intuitive formulas for optimal tax salience by specifying only that consumers under-react to some taxes relative to others, without having to make assumptions about exactly why they under-react the way in which they do.
The Model and Results

Setup
Society is composed of a representative taxpayer, who divides her income between two goods:
x and a composite of all other goods, y. I assume that utility depends only on consumption of x and y, and that the function is concave and smooth with respect to each good.
' The salience tax requires a consumer to suer some cognitive cost, but because of that cost, the consumer rationally chooses to ignore the tax. This agent does not violate (A1) because given her decision-making strategy, she does not suer any direct utility cost when confronted with the tax.
' Consistent with (A1), this implies that tax salience does not aect utility apart from its eect on consumption. government must raise revenue R 0 from taxes on x (good y is left untaxed). The government has two tax designs from which to choose: a high-salience tax t h and a low-salience tax t l . The taxpayer's budget constraint takes the form
where p represents the pre-tax price of x, I is income, and the price of y is normalized to 1.
Production of x is characterized by constant returns to scale technology, so that the pre-tax price of x is xed at its (constant) marginal cost. Taking income as xed, demand for x and y can be expressed as a function of the two tax rates: x = x(t h , t l ) and y = y(t h , t l ). Total government revenue R is thus given by
Consistent with the behavioral evidence described in the introduction, the model takes as its starting point the observation that consumers adjust their demand more strongly in response to changes in high salience taxes than to changes in low salience taxes. As in 
To illustrate the notation, a tax that appears as part of a good's posted price (e.g. an excise tax) would be fully-salient (i.e. θ = 1). In contrast, a tax to which consumers were entirely unresponsive would imply θ = 0. Finally, I assume that the two taxes available to the policymaker have diering (but individually xed) degrees of salience:
Whether (A3) applies in a particular context is an empirical question. One common situation in which (A3) will be satised for commodity taxes is when the government has access to one tax instrument that is less than fully salient (θ L < 1), and another that directly aects the posted price of the taxed good (θ
imposes that the salience of the two tax instruments is between 0 and 1.
Proposition 1
Under (A1) -(A3), the optimal combination of high-and low-salience taxes achieves the same welfare outcome as a non-distortionary lump-sum tax.
Proof of Proposition 1
From (2), the government's revenue constraint is given by
Consider a government that meets (4) by imposing some combination of high-and lowsalience taxes. This government may adjust the taxes it imposes, but it must do so in a revenue-neutral way in order for (4) to continue to hold. Note that because θ H > θ L , the revenue brought in by a high-salience tax increase is less than the revenue raised by a low-salience tax increase of the same magnitude:
Consequently, a revenue-neutral increase in t l accommodates a greater than one-for-one re-
Now consider the welfare eect of a revenue-neutral increase in t l and reduction in t h .
The agent's utility induced by a particular tax policy is given by
Totally dierentiating this function reveals that a revenue-neutral shift towards the low salience tax will benet consumers if and only if
Drawing on our behavioral assumptions (3) and the consumer's budget constraint (1), we can rewrite (7) as:
In (8), the rst term represents the positive utility gain stemming from the additional purchasing power associated with the lower (total) taxes made possible by the shift. The second term captures the utility loss from the additional mistake induced by the shift, i.e. the I assume throughout that demand for the taxed good is not so sensitive that levying a new excise tax would actually reduce revenue: ∂x
departure from the optimal allocation between x and y.
Finally, using (5) and a little algebra, it is straightforward to show that (8) simplies to:
Note that at the optimum, the government's choice of t h and t l satises (9) and (4) with equality. Note further that the well-behaved nature of the the utility function and revenue constraint guarantees a unique solution to the government's maximization problem. That is, Equations (1), (9), and (4) uniquely determine the optimal tax combination by pinning down the taxpayer's consumption of x and y.
To prove Proposition 1, we will compare the conditions characterizing the solution to the government's optimal salience problem with the conditions characterizing the taxpayer's consumption under a lump-sum tax. Consider the eect on consumption of a (fully-salient)
lump-sum tax of size R 0 . Because the lump-sum tax is fully-salient (A2) implies that we can nd the consumption bundle induced by the tax by solving the ordinary consumer maximization problem subject to the lump-sum tax budget constraint:
which yields the rst-order condition:
Comparing the conditions that characterize consumption under the optimal salience policy 1, (4) and (9) with the conditions that characterize consumption under the lump-sum tax ((10) (11)) reveals that both tax instruments induce the same consumption bundle. Because (A1) guarantees that consumption is a sucient statistic for welfare, the optimal salience policy and the lump-sum tax achieve the same welfare result as well.
Discussion of Proposition 1 Proposition 1 states that when policymakers can manipulate the design of distortionary commodity taxes to modulate consumer responsiveness, they can do so in a way that replicates the consumption decisions that taxpayers would make under a lump-sum tax and that raises the same amount of revenue.
To understand the intuition behind the result, it is helpful to consider a stylized example.
Suppose that the government is choosing between a fully-salient tax on x (θ H = 1) and a tax to which consumers are entirely unresponsive (θ L = 0). The consumer's pre-tax budget constraint is given by AB in Figure 1 , and consumption (x 0 ) is characterized by the tangency of the consumer's indierence curve (I C 0 ) with AB. Because any feasible choice of tax rates must raise R 0 , the taxpayer's nal consumption will lie somewhere on the line CD, which is simply AB shifted down by the vertical distance R 0 .
If the government relied solely on t h , the consumer's budget constraint will shift to AE; consumption of the taxed good (x h ) is the value that induces tangency with the consumer's new indierence curve (I C h ). As in the standard case, the tax generates excess burden by driving consumers to substitute away from the taxed good.
In contrast, if the government relied solely on t l , consumption of the taxed good (x l ) would not change: x l = x 0 . Although consumers do not substitute away from the taxed good, the tax still generates an excess burden because consumers fail to adjust their consumption to account for the tax's (non-distortionary) income eect.
Finally, under a lump-sum tax, there are no relative price changes. Consequently, consumption of the taxed good (x LST ) only falls in response to the tax's income eect. Graphically, x LST is characterized by the point at which the consumer's indierence curve is tangent to the new budget constraint (CD). Assuming that x is a normal good, it is easy to see that
! Because the lump-sum tax represents the rst-best welfare outcome, the optimal policy lies somewhere between full reliance on either t h or t l . Intuitively, by shifting ! This condition may fail when θ H < 1 or θ L > 0. In such cases, the government may need to rely on a combination of taxes and subsidies to reach x LST . If subsidies are unavailable, the optimal policy takes the form of a corner-solution, discussed below.
the balance between the high-and low-salience tax, the government can move consumption along CD until it achieves x LST .
Suppose that θ H = 1. Then under (A1) -(A3), the optimal size of the low-salience tax is non-zero, t l ̸ = 0.
Proof of Corollary 1.1
By contradiction. Suppose that the optimal combination of high-and low-salience taxes entailed t l = 0. Under (A2), this policy implies that the taxpayer behaves as a fully-optimizing agent. Because the taxpayer's budget constraint is given by (p + t h ) x+y=I , consumption satises the standard rst-order condition for an interior maximum:
However, we also know that at the optimal combination of high-and low-salience taxes, consumption is such that 9 holds with equality. Because R 0 > 0 implies t h > 0, Equations 9 and 12 may not be satised simultaneously. Hence we may conclude that t l ̸ = 0.
Discussion of Corollary 1.1 Corollary 1.1 highlights a somewhat surprising result. Even when policymakers have acess to a fully-salient tax instrument one that induces no consumer mistakes consumers are actually better o when the government utilizes a less than fully-salient tax. Intuitively, the optimal tax salience problem reects a basic tension between high-and low-salience taxes.
On the one hand, the less salient a tax is, the more it mutes consumer substitution away from the taxed good, thereby reducing the deadweight loss typically associated with non-lump-sum taxes. On the other hand, by causing consumers to depart from optimal decision-making, low salience taxes drive consumers to make optimization errors when making their purchasing decisions.
The key insight is that when taxes on x are close to fully-salient, the former eect will be large relative to the latter. To see why, recall that by making the tax a little less salient, the government can raise the same amount of revenue while reducing the tax's distortionary eects on consumption, thereby reducing the traditional source of excess burden. Although the reduction in salience does drive consumers to accidentally over-consume x relative to y, the utility cost of that optimization error is trivial when the tax is close to fully salient; because consumers facing a fully-salient tax allign the marginal utility of expenditures on x and y, consuming a little too much x relative to the optimum will not generate much less utility than if the consumer had purchased y instead. Put dierently, because the optimization error engendered by the low-salience tax depends on the dierence in marginal utilities between x and y, the welfare cost of that error is small when the consumer is near the optimum, (i.e.
when the tax is close to fully salient).
More practically, Corollary 1.1 highlights that whenever taxes on a particular good are fully-salient, welfare can be improved by a small revenue-neutral shift towards a less-salient tax instrument. (own-price elasticity of x, dened to be positive).
Let ρ denote the fraction of taxes on x that are low-salience: ρ ≡ t l t h +t l . Under (A1) -(A3), the optimal combination of high-and low-salience taxes is (approximately) given by the value of ρ that solves ρθ
Additionally, dene τ to be the size of the commodity tax needed to generate R 0 when taxpayers consume at the rst-best level of x, τ = R 0 /x LST . Dene t h to be the level of the high-salience tax that induces taxpayers to consume at the rst-best level of x (when no other taxes are imposed):
The values of the high-and low-salience taxes that achieves the rst best welfare outcome is (exactly) given by:
" All quantities are evaluated at the no-tax baseline. 
Proof of Proposition 2
To understand how one can employ high-and low-salience taxes to implement the rstbest solution, consider the following approach. First, set t h = t h , where t h is dened as the level of the high-salience tax that induces consumption of x at the rst-best amount:
Although t h induces the rst-best level of x, the revenue raised at t h is less than R 0 (because t h is distortionary).
The key to meeting the government's revenue target without departing from x LST is to adjust the balance between t h and t l in ways that increase revenue but do not aect consumption of x. That is, by strategically combining increases in t l with reductions in t h , policymakers can increase revenue without causing individuals to substitute away from x. To see this, note that totally dierentiating x(t h , t l ) yields:
Consequently, movements along the line 
Setting R = R 0 allows us to solve for the value of δ that raises the required amount of revenue:
where Using 14, we can solve for the optimal values of t h and t l : 
where η x,I = Substituting 17 into 15 and 16 yields a more intuitive characterization of the optimal tax rates: For Proposition 1 to hold, there must exist some (t h , t l ) combination that raises revenue of 30 and induces the same consumption as the lump-sum tax, namely (x, y) = (6, 60). First, note that τ = R 0 /x LST = 30/6 = 5. Additionally, from the agent's utility function, it is straightforward to solve for t h , the value of t h that induces x LST = 6. In particular, t h = 5/3. to it a tax instrument (either t h or t l ) with salience θ * , the optimal policy is to rely on it entirely. When no such tax is available, the government may replicate its welfare eects by employing a combination of the tax instruments that are available. The closer the salience of an available tax is to θ * , the more heavily the government should rely on it.
Second, the θ * formula provides insight into how the optimal combination of high-and low-salience taxes achieves the rst best; loosely speaking, it does so by replicating the behavioral eects of a lump-sum tax. That is, an increase in a fully-salient commodity tax reduces demand for the taxed good through both a substitution and an income eect,
, whereε x,p denotes the compensated (Hicksian) own-price elasticity of demand. In contrast, an increase in a lump-sum tax reduces demand for the tax good solely through an income eect, ω x η x,I . By scaling the demand response to the tax by θ * = ωx η x,I εx,p , the optimal policy eectively removes all but the income eect associated with the lowsalience tax.
$ Note that for normal goods, θ * ∈ [0, 1).
Third, the optimal combination of high-and low-salience instruments depends upon the nature of demand for the good being taxed. 
. Substituting t * l = 4 and t * h = 1 into the demand functions (along with I = 120 and p = 5) yield x = 6 and y = 60. Finally, revenue R = (t h + t l ) x = (5) (6) = 30.
$ Additionally, this result is consistent with the formula derived by CLK for the deadweight loss associated with the introduction of a tax into a previously untaxed market. In particular, that formula implies that a new tax would generate no deadweight loss if it happens to have salience equal to θ * . % Intuitively, this result follows from the fact that the excess burden associated with a tax depends on the compensated elasticity of the taxed good (Auerbach 1985) . The greater the compensated elasticity, the larger the welfare gains from reducing the consumer substitution that is typically associated with commodity ' Mechanically, this result follows from the fact thatε x,p > 0 when consumers behave optimally, and (A1) readily estimable, care must be taken to evaluate them at the no-tax baseline.
Finally, Proposition 2 highlights the conditions under which subsidies will be required to implement the rst-best welfare outcome. In particular, when subsidies are unavailable, the government will be able to implement the rst-best welfare outcome if and
In that case, it is straightforward to show that the optimal policy takes the form of a corner solution, in which the government relies solely on the tax that has salience closest to θ * .
When subsidies are available and θ * < θ L , Equations 18 and 19 show that implementing the rst-best requires utilizing a high-salience subsidy in conjunction with a low-salience tax.
Additionally, 18 highlights the factors that shape how large the high-salience subsidy must be to achieve the rst-best, for a given value of θ * . First, when revenue requirements from taxes on x (R 0 ) are large and the amount of x consumed under the rst-best policy (x LST ) is small, τ will be large and hence the required subsidy will tend to be large as well.
Second, when the available tax instruments have similar salience, i.e. θ H ≈ θ L , the required subsidy will be quite large. In the extreme case in which θ H = θ L , the required subsidy would be innitely large and (A3) will not hold.
Although Proposition 1 shows that the rst-best welfare outcome can technically be achieved as long as (A1) -(A3) hold, there are reasons to suspect that the model may guarantees that consumers behave optimally at the no-tax baseline whereε x,p is evaluated. To understand the intuition, consider a tax to which consumers are entirely unresponsive (θ = 0). Let (x 0 , y 0 ) represent the taxpayer's initial consumption of x and y at tax t 0 . Suppose the government raises the tax to t 1 = t 0 + α.
Because θ = 0, consumers buy the same amount of x as before the tax increase, leaving them with α x 0 less income to spend on other goods.
When η x,I = 0, the consumer's response to the tax exactly matches what a fully-optimizing agent would do. Because the optimal choice of x does not depend on income, the consumer has nothing to gain by reconsidering her consumption on x after a decline in income. In contrast, when η x,I > 0, the consumer who fails to adjust her consumption of x in response to a tax increase is worse o for failing to do so. See Chetty Mechanically, this follows from 18 and 19. An immediate implication is that the rst-best is always attainable without subsidies when the government has available to it taxes with salience θ L = 0 and θ H = 1. When considering subsidies, I focus on the case in which θ * < θ L rather than the case in which θ * > θ H for two reasons. First, in many contexts, the government will have a tax instrument such as an excise tax that can shape the posted price, implying θ H = 1 ≥ θ * . Second, numerical computations suggest that for many goods, θ * is likely to be quite low.
A nal point relating to subsidies is that the analysis thus far has implicitly assumed that the salience of a tax instrument is identical to the salience of a similarly-designed subsidy. Of course, this need not be the case. However, such asymmetries are unlikely to pose serious problems to implementation when the government can impose a subsidy that directly aects a good's posted price. And in at least certain contexts, tax subsidies may have higher salience than similarly-designed taxes (Feldman and Rue 2013).
break down when large taxes (and subsidies) are required. In particular, the model assumes that the salience of the available tax instruments is xed and constant. In practice, there are good reasons to think that consumers will become more attentive to a tax as the amount at stake increases.
! Thus the feasibility of the rst-best welfare outcome may be most plausible when the required size of the low-salience tax is not too large. From 19, we know this tends to occur when the dierence in the salience of the available tax instruments (θ
relatively large, the revenue required to be raised from x (R 0 ) relatively small, the amount of x consumed under the rst-best (x LST ) relatively large, and the optimal degree of salience (θ * ) relatively high. The next section formalizes these intuitions.
Optimal Policy When Salience is Endogenous
Thus far, I have assumed that the degre of salience associated with the available tax instruments is xed and exogenous to the model. In practice, however, it is possible that the salience of a tax depends in part on the size of the tax. For example, a bounded rationality model of decision-making suggests that consumers will be more likely to pay attention to larger taxes because the utility costs of neglecting the tax will tend to be larger as well In the commodity tax context, Feldman and Rue (2013) do not nd any evidence that tax salience eects diminish when moving from low-to high-priced products, even though a consumer's failure to cosider an ad-valorem tax has a larger utility cost in the latter case than in the former.
# Additionally, the salience of the tax (as it is dened here) will reect both the level of taxpayers' attentiveness to the tax as well as the change in that attentiveness associated with the tax increase. That is, for tax t with salience θ, the eect of increasing the tax is given by:
Consequently, some values of a low-salience tax may be associated with a θ > 1, even when some taxpayers remain inattentive to the tax. Put dierently, an increase in the degree to which consumers account for a tax (following an increase in that tax) are captured in the value of θ.
government has two tax instruments available to it, a high-salience tax with θ H xed at 1, and a low-salience tax where the salience depends upon the size of the tax, θ L = θ L (t l ).
We can begin as before by setting t h at the level necessary to induce consumers to consume
x at the rst-best amount, t h = t h . Like before, consider a reduction in t h along with an increase in t l so that the net eect is to leave consumption of x at x LST . Totally dierentiating demand for x yields
As a result, the additional revenue generated by an x-neutral increase in t l is given by
order to attain the rst-best, the government must be able to increase t l (and reduce t h ) by a sucient amount to raise R 0 without altering demand for x. Consequently, the rst-best welfare outcome is feasible if and only if there exists a value of the low-salience tax,t l , such
Thus, when the salience of the available tax instruments is endogenous, determining whether the rst-best welfare outcome is feasible depends on the specics of the θ L (.) function over the range of values necessary to generate R 0 . The smaller the revenue that must be raised from x, the larger the agent's consumption of x, and the slower that θ L increases, the more likely it is that the government will be able to attain the rst-best welfare outcome.
Additionally, even when the salience of the available tax instruments increases too fast to achieve the rst-best, the above results still provide local guidance to policymakers. Under (A1)-(A3), and the additional assumption of additively-separable utility, Appendix A shows that policymakers should incrementally increase their reliance on the low-salience tax when- % $ By increase their reliance on the low-salience tax, I mean increasing t l by a small amount while also reducing t h by the amount that leaves total revenue unchanged.
% One possibility, inconsistent with (A2), is that taxpayers suer psychological costs from accounting for low-salience taxes, and that these costs are increasing as attentiveness to the tax increases. In this case, 21 being satised no longer guarantees that policymakers can reach the rst-best; even when the taxes induce consumers to choose the rst-best bundle of goods, consumers may be worse-o relative to the rst-5. Optimal Salience in the Presence of Externalities Proposition 3 Suppose that consumption of x generates an externality ϕ(x). Then under (A1) -(A3):
(a) The optimal combination of high-and low-saliences taxes achieves the rst-best welfare outcome.
(b) The optimal combination of high-and low-salience taxes is (approximately) characterized by ρθ
, and t p is the size of the pigouvian tax that induces the rst-best when a lump-sum tax is available,
. Part (b) states that when consumption of x generates a negative (positive) externality, the optimal degree of reliance on the high-salience tax (t h ) is higher (lower) than when no externality is present.
Proof of Proposition 3
For concreteness, assume that consuming x reduces social welfare W by some positive quan- 
The eect on social welfare of a revenue-neutral shift towards low-salience taxes is given by best because they are suering the psychological costs associated with paying some attention to the lowsalience tax. On the other hand, to the extent that attentiveness to the taxes is (locally) fairly constant, policymakers may still employ the local approach described in this section for making incremental changes to the combination of high-and low-salience taxes that they employ.
Applying that same approach as in the proof of Proposition 1, it is straightforward to
Of course, 23 is exactly the condition that characterizes the rst-best welfare outcome in the presence of externalities: the marginal individual benet of buying an additional unit of the taxed good, U x (x * , y * ), is balanced against the marginal individual and social costs associated with doing so, p U y (x * , y
Part (b) The approach to characterizing the optimal combination of high-and low-salience taxes here is similar to the case in which externalities are not present (Proposition 2). As before, dene t h to be the value of the high-salience tax that induces the agent to consume at the rst-best level of consumption, x 1st . And as before, (A3) implies that the government can increase t l and decrease t h in a combination that increases revenue but leaves demand for x unchanged. Thus as before, the optimal values of the high-and low-salience taxes, t * h and t * l , are given by 15 and 16. The only dierence caused by the presence of the externality is in the level of x associated with the rst-best, and hence in the value of t h as well.
To nd t h , rst note that because of the form of the problem, the rst-best solution is achieved by setting a fully-salient commodity tax equal to the marginal social cost of the externality, and employing a lump-sum tax to generate (or refund) any additional revenue that is required. That is, if we were to express demand for x as a function of the posted price, the high-and low-salience taxes, and income, we can write y 1st ) is the pigouvian tax necessary to achieve the rst-best when a lump-sum tax is available, and L = R 0 − t p x 1st is the value of that lump-sum tax. The value of t h is thus implicitly dened by the following equation:
To approximate the solution to the optimal combination, note that subtracting x(p, 0, 0, I) from both sides of 24 and taking rst-order Taylor approximations yields:
where all derivatives are evaluated at the no-tax baseline. Using the denition of L and the Slutsky equation, this implies
where the last equality follows from applying the denition of θ
Substituting 25 into 14, 15, and 16 yields formula for the optimal high-and low-salience taxes in the presence of an externality:
Finally, applying the denition of ρ = 
Discussion of Proposition 3
Proposition 3 demonstrates that the government's choice of tax salience raises special considerations in the context of Pigouvian taxation. Intuitively, taxes on externality-generating activities can only internalize the social costs of those activities to the extent that decisionmakers account for the existence of the tax when choosing their behavior. When a Pigouvian tax increases social welfare by discouraging taxpayers from engaging in a particular activity, the government will face an additional eciency cost to reducing the salience of that tax.
Conversely, when the taxed activity generates positive externalities, the eciency benets to relying on low-salience taxes are greater than would otherwise be the case.
&
To illustrate, suppose that θ H = 1, θ L = 0, and θ * = 0 for some good x. Suppose this good generates a negative externality such that the optimal Pigouvian tax is given by t p > 0.
Equations 26 and 27 imply that the optimal policy is to set t h = t p and t l = τ − t p . When θ H < 1, the optimal size of the high-salience tax will need to be scaled up to fully internalize the externality with respect to taxpayers' consumption decisions:
Finally, when θ H = 1, θ L = 0, and θ * ∈ (0, 1), the optimal policy is to set t h as a weighted average between raising revenue and correcting the externality, t h = θ * τ + (1 − θ * ) t p , and
Proposition 3 has important practical implications for policymakers concerned with bringing about behavioral changes on the part of taxpayers. For example, to reduce population weight, a number of states levy sales taxes on soda and/or candy while exempting other food purchases from the sales tax base. Although this approach may increase the true relative price of unhealthful foods, the analysis here suggests that such taxes would be more likely to generate the intended behavioral eects if they were designed in more salient ways.
Conclusion
A long literature within public nance considers how to mitigate the excess burden of distortionary taxation. Motivated by new empirical ndings that a tax's salience aects consumer behavior, this paper shows that seemingly-mundane choices about tax design may have surprisingly large eects on consumer welfare; making decisions about tax design in a strategic way can ease the burden of distortionary taxation. More generally, the results illustrate that careful attention to the biases that characterize individual decision-making may oer policymakers unexplored possibilities for improving consumer welfare through the manipulation of commonly-available (but frequently overlooked) tools.
One feature of my results that may be surprising is that the optimal policy requires the government to design its taxes in a way that drives consumers to make mistakes. That is, even when the government has access to a fully-salient tax (θ h = 1), Corollary 1.1 implies that taxpayers are actually better o when the government also employs a tax that causes them to make mistakes. This result can be readily understood as an example of the Theory of the Second Best (Lipsey and Lancaster 1956) . That is, the government's need to raise revenue through a commodity tax generates a distortion that pushes social welfare away from the rstbest welfare outcome. Consequently, by introducing a new distortion taxpayer deviations from optimal decision-making policymakers can actually increase social welfare.
On a more practical level, the results here suggest that governments should typically avoid relying exclusively on fully-salient taxes (unless the purpose of the tax is solely to reduce consumption of the taxed good). Instead, the optimal combination of high-and low-salience taxes should depend on the nature of demand for the taxed good, in particular the ratio of the income and substitution eects. Similarly, policymakers should be skeptical of calls for tax-inclusive price regulations of the type common outside of the United States. Although Section 4 showed that the rst-best welfare outcome may not be attainable when tax salience is endogenous and revenue demands are large, the results described in that section provide important guidance to policymakers about making incremental eciency improvements.
Along the same lines, the results highlight the eciency-enhancing potential of a tax instrument that is sustainably low-salience, i.e. a tax that remains low-salience even when it is levied at high rates. As such, an important takeaway of this paper is the desirability of new research into the factors that shape consumers attentiveness to a tax, and in particular, to the conditions that determine whether consumers remain inattentive as the tax rate increases. In shows how governments can manipulate tax salience to reduce commodity tax regressivity when high-and low-income consumers dier in their attentiveness to low-salience taxes.
Additionally, tax salience aects the incidence of a tax between consumers and producers.
In particular, show that reducing tax salience can increase the fraction of the tax passed on to consumers. As in other contexts, the ultimate distributional eects of the choice between high-and low-salience taxes depend upon the supply and demand for the factors employed in production of the taxed good.
' Another question that merits further exploration concerns the optimal combination of high-and lowsalience taxes in the context of multiple taxed-goods. In order to investigate issues of tax design, I have focused on the case of a single taxed good and treated as exogenous the amount of revenue required to be raised from taxes on that good. Because the government cannot realistically raise all of its revenue from commodity taxes on a single good, issues of salience may have important interactions with the question of how to apportion taxes between goods, especially when the salience of a tax is a function of its size.
positive. Note that all of these quantities are evaluated at (t h , t l ) = (0, 0). 
